Category Navigation:

Kategorie

Action & Adventure

Architecture & Design

Art

Asian Interest

Biographies

Bioscience & Clinical Medicine

Business, Finance

Calculators

Cartoons

Classics

Computing, Internet

Cooking

Current Events

Dictionaries

Economics

Education

Encyclopedias

Entertainment

Erotica

Family

Fantasy

Games / Multimedia

Gay & Lesbian

Gender Studies

General Fiction

Geography

Health

Historical Fiction

History

Horror

House & Home

Humor

Humor Political

Juvenile Fiction

Language & Linguistics

Law

Literary Criticism & Collections

Mathematics

Media & Communication

Medical

Movies & TV Series

Music & Songs

Mystery & Crime

Nature

Novels

Performing Arts

Personal Finance

Pets

Philosophy

Poetry

Politics

Psychology

Quizzes

Reference

Religious Fiction

Restaurant Guides

Romance

San-Antonio

Science & Technical

Science Fiction

Self-Improvement

Short Stories

Sociology

Spiritual & Religion

Sports & Outdoors

Study Aids

Suspense & Thrillers

Tales & Fables

Technological Fiction

Technology

Theatre

Travel

True Crime

Undefined


Nakladatelství
Autoři
X

E-kniha přidána do košíku

E-kniha A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE byla úspěšně přidána do košíku.

Pokračovat v nakupování

Zavřít

A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE

A SYSTEM OF LOGIC, RATIOCINATIVE AND INDUCTIVE

Autor:   Mill, John Stuart

Nakladatelství: Thomas C. Breuer
ISBN:


Původní cena:   111 Kč
Vaše cena:   101 Kč

Formát:
Co to je?
Do košíku

Popis knihy:

Contents: PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION. PREFACE TO THE THIRD EDITION. INTRODUCTION. BOOK I. OF NAMES AND PROPOSITIONS. CHAPTER I. OF THE NECESSITY OF COMMENCING WITH AN ANALYSIS OF LANGUAGE. CHAPTER II. OF NAMES. CHAPTER III. OF THE THINGS DENOTED BY NAMES. I. Feelings, or States of Consciousness. II. Substances. III. Attributes: and, first, Qualities. IV. Relations. V. Quantity. VI. Attributes Concluded. VII. General Results. CHAPTER IV. OF PROPOSITIONS. CHAPTER V. OF THE IMPORT OF PROPOSITIONS. CHAPTER VI. OF PROPOSITIONS MERELY VERBAL. CHAPTER VII. OF THE NATURE OF CLASSIFICATION, AND THE FIVE PREDICABLES. CHAPTER VIII. OF DEFINITION. BOOK II. OF REASONING. CHAPTER I. OF INFERENCE, OR REASONING, IN GENERAL. CHAPTER II. OF RATIOCINATION, OR SYLLOGISM. CHAPTER III. OF THE FUNCTIONS, AND LOGICAL VALUE, OF THE SYLLOGISM. CHAPTER IV. OF TRAINS OF REASONING, AND DEDUCTIVE SCIENCES. CHAPTER V. OF DEMONSTRATION, AND NECESSARY TRUTHS. CHAPTER VI. THE SAME SUBJECT CONTINUED. BOOK III. OF INDUCTION. CHAPTER I. PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS ON INDUCTION IN GENERAL. CHAPTER II. OF INDUCTIONS IMPROPERLY SO CALLED. CHAPTER III. OF THE GROUND OF INDUCTION. CHAPTER IV. OF LAWS OF NATURE. CHAPTER V. OF THE LAW OF UNIVERSAL CAUSATION. CHAPTER VI. OF THE COMPOSITION OF CAUSES. CHAPTER VII. OF OBSERVATION AND EXPERIMENT. CHAPTER VIII. OF THE FOUR METHODS OF EXPERIMENTAL INQUIRY. CHAPTER IX. MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES OF THE FOUR METHODS. CHAPTER X. OF PLURALITY OF CAUSES; AND OF THE INTERMIXTURE OF EFFECTS. CHAPTER XI. OF THE DEDUCTIVE METHOD. CHAPTER XII. OF THE EXPLANATION OF LAWS OF NATURE. CHAPTER XIII. MISCELLANEOUS EXAMPLES OF THE EXPLANATION OF LAWS OF NATURE. a selection from the INTRODUCTION: There is as great diversity among authors in the modes which they have adopted of defining logic, as in their treatment of the details of it. This is what might naturally be expected on any subject on which writers have availed themselves of the same language as a means of delivering different ideas. Ethics and jurisprudence are liable to the remark in common with logic. Almost every writer having taken a different view of some of the particulars which these branches of knowledge are usually understood to include; each has so framed his definition as to indicate beforehand his own peculiar tenets, and sometimes to beg the question in their favour. This diversity is not so much an evil to be complained of, as an inevitable and in some degree a proper result of the imperfect state of those sciences. It is not to be expected that there should be agreement about the definition of a thing, until there is agreement about the thing itself. To define a thing, is to select from among the whole of its properties those which shall be understood to be designated and declared by its name; and the properties must be well known to us before we can be competent to determine which of them are fittest to be chosen for this purpose. Accordingly, in the case of so complex an aggregation of particulars as are comprehended in anything which can be called a science, the definition we set out with is seldom that which a more extensive knowledge of the subject shows to be the most appropriate. Until we know the particulars themselves, we cannot fix upon the most correct and compact mode of circumscribing them by a general description. It was not till after an extensive and accurate acquaintance with the [pg 002] details of chemical phenomena, that it was found possible to frame a rational definition of chemistry; and the definition of the science of life and organization is still a matter of dispute....

Hodnocení uživatelů:

(0 z 5) Pro Vaše hodnocení klikněte na stupnici

Názory:

Zatím žádné názory.

Napište Váš názor:




První kapitola zdarma:

Stáhněte si zdarma první kapitolu knihy.