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The Mathematicall Praeface to Elements of Geometrie of Euclid of Megara
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a selection from the introductory (written in Middle English): In thinges Naturall, probabilitie and coniecture hath place: But in things Supernaturall, chief demonstration, &most sure Science is to be had. By which properties &comparasons of these two, more easily may be described, the state, condition, nature and property of those thinges, which, we before termed of a third being: which, by a peculier name also, are called Thynges Mathematicall. For, these, beyng (in a maner) middle, betwene thinges supernaturall and naturall: are not so absolute and excellent, as thinges supernatural: Nor yet so base and grosse, as things naturall: But are thinges immateriall: and neuerthelesse, by materiall things hable somewhat to be signified. And though their particular Images, by Art, are aggregable and diuisible: yet the generall Formes, notwithstandyng, are constant, vnchaungeable, vntransformable, and incorruptible. Neither of the sense, can they, at any tyme, be perceiued or iudged. Nor yet, for all that, in the royall mynde of man, first conceiued. But, surmountyng the imperfection of coniecture, weenyng and opinion: and commyng short of high intellectuall conception, are the Mercurial fruite of Dianoeticall discourse, in perfect imagination subsistyng. A meruaylous newtralitie haue these thinges Mathematicall, and also a straunge participation betwene thinges supernaturall, immortall, intellectual, simple and indiuisible: and thynges naturall, mortall, sensible, compounded and diuisible. Probabilitie and sensible prose, may well serue in thinges naturall: and is commendable: In Mathematicall reasoninges, a probable Argument, is nothyng regarded: nor yet the testimony of sense, any whit credited: But onely a perfect demonstration, of truthes certaine, necessary, and inuincible: vniuersally and necessaryly concluded: is allowed as sufficient for ""an Argument exactly and purely Mathematical."" Of Mathematicall thinges, are two principall kindes: namely, Number, and Magnitude. [Number.] Number, we define, to be, a certayne Mathematicall Summe, of Vnits. And, an Vnit, is that thing Mathematicall, Indiuisible, by participation of some likenes of whose property, any thing, which is in deede, or is counted One, may resonably be called One. We account an Vnit, a thing Mathematicall, though it be no Number, and also indiuisible: because, of it, materially, Number doth consist: which, principally, is a thing Mathematicall. [Magnitude.] Magnitude is a thing Mathematicall, by participation of some likenes of whose nature, any thing is iudged long, broade, or thicke. ""A thicke Magnitude we call a Solide, or a Body. What Magnitude so euer, is Solide or Thicke, is also broade, &long. A broade magnitude, we call a Superficies or a Plaine. Euery playne magnitude, hath also length. A long magnitude, we terme a Line. A Line is neither thicke nor broade, but onely long: Euery certayne Line, hath two endes: [A point.] The endes of a line, are Pointes called. A Point, is a thing Mathematicall, indiuisible, which may haue a certayne determined situation."" If a Poynt moue from a determined situation, the way wherein it moued, is also a Line: mathematically produced, whereupon, of the auncient Mathematiciens, [A Line.] a Line is called the race or course of a Point. A Poynt we define, by the name of a thing Mathematicall: though it be no Magnitude, and indiuisible: because it is the propre ende, and bound of a Line: which is a true Magnitude. [Magnitude.]Hodnocení uživatelů:
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